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 ‘Constellations of singularities’: the rejection of representative democracy in Coney’s Early Days 
(of a better nation) 
 
There has been a crisis. There has been a revolution. The dictator has been overthrown. The country 
lies in ruins. The nation is divided with the people from the Plains and the Islands mindful of their 
own resources, and the people from the City desperate for help. We wait in line. I am given a 
postcard from my mother in the city and am led into a debating chamber where the spokeswoman 
of the people from the city, Angela, updates us on the current situation. The Islands have food, the 
Plains have Power supplies, the City, once the driving economic centre of the country, lies in ruins 
and has very little of anything. Hospitals are inadequate throughout the country, there is need of 
mass vaccination, security is virtually non-existent and so power supplies and food are both under 
threat. The International Security Council (ISC) has offered to send in peace-keeping troops but the 
cost of this to the country’s independence and sovereignty is not clear. Angela asks us to share our 
own stories which are indicated on the postcards we hold. We have been invited to a national 
meeting of the three regions and there we must decide, as a nation, whether or not to accept the 
help from the International Security Council. Angela is clearly keen on this course of action and from 
the perspective of a city dweller I can’t see that we have much choice. We are led into a large hall 
where we meet the representatives of the other two regions and are informed that we have only a 
limited time to decide whether or not the ISC should be invited in. Debate ensues; some people say 
a lot, some, possibly most, say nothing. There is intermittent commentary from the news reporter 
who is both present and on screen to the watching world. The debate is chaotic and runs out of 
time. Forced to a vote of yes, no, or abstain, we decide, narrowly, to reject the ISC in favour of 
building a ruling coalition that will maintain the country’s sovereignty. I have cast my vote for the ISC 
but to no avail. We must now decide, not what to do in government but, before we even get that 
far, how our decisions on what to do are going to be made. We now had to decide how to decide. 
Coney’s production, Early Days (of a better nation), was an interactive performance that was 
developed in consultation with academics from the Department of Political Economy at King’s 
College, London and academics at Warwick University. The show previewed in 2014, when I 
attended my first show on November 15th (matinee), as a person from the Plains, at the Oval Theatre 
in London, and toured nationally throughout the following spring. The second time I attended, as a 
person from the City, was at Warwick Arts Centre on 12th May 2015. The insights I gained from my 
two visits have been further enhanced by generous interviews afforded to me by Annette Mees, co-
director of the production, and Astrid Breel, a researcher attached to the project, both of whom 
were able to give me access to outcomes of performances that had turned out very differently from 
the ones I attended, a broader sense of audience response and reaction across the tour, and insight 
into the aims and expectations of the creators of the work.  Mees was very clear that one of her 
principle aims for the project was ‘to get audience together to talk about big ideas’; and that a 
‘successful’ show for her was ‘not about how far they get, but the quality of the debate within the 
process’ (Mees, 2015). Speaking to researcher Astrid Breel, who had compiled and analysed almost 
100 audience questionnaires from those taking part in the London performances, there was plenty 
of evidence to suggest that many participants had indeed valued this opportunity to take part in 
political debate, and some had expressed their intention to continue doing so in the future (Breel, 
2015a). For someone like myself, who spends much of their time involved in political debate of one 
kind or another, this aspect of the piece was less significant than what the two outcomes I directly 
experienced suggested to me about the limitations of a certain tendency which was becoming 
increasingly prevalent in contemporary left-wing political theory and radical philosophy. And that 
unique shape of my own response to Early Days is specifically what I would like to share in this 
article.  
The options that arose from the debates that followed the rejection of the International 
Security Council’s offer of help were whether we would devolve decision-making to a single leader, a 
committee made up of representatives from each region, or whether each individual would retain a 
vote on every decision. In both cases I voted for the second option of representational democracy; in 
London, we ended up with one person one vote; in Warwick, we ended up with a bit of a mess. A 
chairperson who would orchestrate decision making seemed to arise from an inconclusive and 
rowdy process without it being clear how that had come about and without anyone volunteering to 
take up that particular role. A reluctant chair was duly appointed, by some process that I was unable 
to follow, and was then ignored and made irrelevant throughout the second half of the show which 
proceeded in the seeming absence of any system whatsoever. Both of these experiences offered an 
opportunity to witness and analyse a decision making process in action that is rare to experience in 
democracies and their institutional organisations, both most often governed by political systems 
where individuals vote for representatives, who then populate institutional structures to vote – in 
principle at least – in accordance with the wishes of a majority of their electorate. 
Over the last decade or so there has been a discernible scepticism in Europe towards such 
institutional democracy and representational party politics which began with the convergence of 
mainstream left and right wing parties in consolidation of the current neoliberal hegemony, and has 
been recently intensified by the threat to democratic sovereignty waged on Greece, among other 
European nations, by the troika (the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund) in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis. The rise in grass roots direct 
action campaigns and seemingly leaderless mass movements such as Occupy, have been inspired by 
and, in turn, have continued to invoke, a leaning in radical political philosophy that tends towards a 
networking of disparate acts of multifarious resistance as opposed to organised and ideologically-
coherent revolt or political opposition. In Empire, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri draw on Deleuze 
and Guattari’s understanding of ‘a new context, a new milieu of maximum plurality and 
uncontainable singularization’ (Hardt and Negri 2000, 25). Hardt and Negri argue that resistance to 
global capital can no longer be mounted by an identifiable mass movement of ‘the people’, as 
envisioned by Marx, but rather by what they call a multitude that is made up of ‘constellations of 
powerful singularities’ (61) that are able to subvert and redirect the creative agency, that global 
capital has afforded them for its own purposes, towards unanticipated and uncoordinated – and so 
undetectable - acts of rebellion. Consequently, Hardt and Negri propose that ‘this new militancy 
does not simply repeat the organizational formulas of the old revolutionary working class’ (412-13 
original emphasis); and conclude therefore that ‘revolutionary political militancy today … must 
rediscover what has always been its proper form: not representational but constituent activity’ (413 
original emphasis). Without wishing to overly conflate complex political discourses that share as 
many distinctions as similarities, it remains notable, in contemporary political theory and radical 
philosophy, how this pervasive emphasis on singularity has correspondingly led to a critique of the 
desirability of co-ordinated mass resistance emerging from a coherent and organised community. 
Communities, in the work of philosopher Jean-Luc Nancy, have been for some time, inoperative 
(Nancy 1991); always deferred even as they are articulated, significant primarily for their capacity to, 
as Nicholas Ridout proposes, open the individual to ‘the experience of encounters with others’ in 
order to mark ‘simultaneously the limit of one’s self, and the place where one’s self, such as it is, 
begins’ (Ridout 2013, 10). In the work of Jacques Rancière, communities become ‘uncertain’ 
(Rancière 2004, 36), drawn together only by their shared capacity for readership or spectatorship of 
the aesthetic object or ‘third thing’, yet whose constituent members remain apart from each other 
by virtue of their unique interpretation.  Indeed Rancière is explicit in his understanding that the 
collective political potential of any audience  
 
does not stem from the fact that they are members of a collective body or from some 
specific form of interactivity. It is the power each of them has to translate what she 
perceives in her own way, to link it to the unique intellectual adventure that makes her 
similar to all the rest in as much as this adventure is not like any other. (Rancière 2009, 
16-17) 
 
Rancière’s notion of a political potential that relies not on collective, predetermined response to 
artistic intention, but on individual and undetermined responses to aesthetic stimuli, has been 
particularly influential within much of the re-thinking of the political that has occurred in theatre and 
performance studies over the past decade, making appearances in recent monographs by Alan Read 
(2008), James Thompson (2009), Maurya Wickstrom (2012) and Nicholas Ridout (2013) among many 
others. For Rancière, and those who draw on him, a political theatre that seeks to effect a political 
outcome is guilty of maintaining the position of mastery that a truly democratic politics should seek 
to disrupt. Like the ‘stultifying pedagogue’ who stands in opposition to Rancière’s ignorant 
schoolmaster, the artist who would seek to effect a particular political outcome is placing 
themselves in the role of the one who knows what is needed and who has the authority to transmit 
that knowledge to others. By doing so, they are denying the spectator their equal right to an 
independent and active interpretation of the third thing (the performance itself); an interpretation 
which must be entirely detached from any causal connection to the artist’s intended meaning. 
Rancière, I think, despite his scepticism of an over-simplistic understanding of interactive 
performance (Rancière 2009, 62), would have approved of Early Days, as the performance 
framework provoked a dis-sensus in that each spectator had to dis-identify from a role which was 
more usually prescribed and directed by the artist, in order to construct a new part which 
manifested an essential equality with all other parts of the playing cast – actors and audience. In the 
broader understanding of dissensus the framework also sustained dissonance amongst its 
fragmented audience; posing questions that had no easy or right answers, with actors provoking 
dissent rather than driving towards consensus, and a technological authority that forced necessarily 
unsatisfactory and inoperative resolutions by the insistence of the ticking clock. Whilst each 
performance offered the same three act structure; the first act spent deciding whether or not to 
invite in the International Security Council, the second act spent deciding how to decide, and the 
third act deciding where to allocate the insufficient national resources, the outcomes of each were 
not designed by the artists to achieve any particular political effect in conclusion, but were entirely 
down to the actions of the audience on the night. In her analysis of the different modes of 
participant agency at work within Early Days, Astrid Breel (2015b) distinguishes three broad 
categories; reactive, interactive and proactive, explaining that proactive agency can be understood 
as the most powerful as it tends to work against the affordances, or in Gareth White’s (2013) terms, 
the frames of invitation, that have been given. Breel (2015a) gave an account of an instance of 
proactive agency during one performance she had attended where the audience had mistakenly 
believed the show to be rigged, that the invitation was, in a sense, a lie, and that they were not 
being afforded the agency they had been promised. As a result the audience turned on the actor 
playing the media commentator – in a significant sense the narrator and one of the few artistic 
givens of the performance – and shut him out of the playing space, attempting to take over his 
microphone and technology to broadcast their own show from that point on. 
It is clear that, within Rancière’s philosophy, such proactive agency has the greatest political 
potential as the spectator thereby rejects all the roles they have been offered by the artist, or 
schoolmaster, to disrupt the distribution of the sensible that the performance framework has 
established and re-write the co-ordinates of the experience, rather than merely working or re-acting 
within the institutional framework they have been offered.  Yet, while the particular outcome cited 
by Breel might suggest revolutionary potential, proactive agency in itself, as I will now demonstrate, 
has no political colours and by the very premise of Rancière’s philosophy, any political effect such 
agency has must be unanticipated, and cannot be prefigured, motivated or inspired.  
Returning after the interval to the third act we were faced with a projection of the financial 
situation:  how many tokens it would cost to vaccinate the nation, how many tokens for hospitals, 
how many tokens for food, how many tokens for security and how many tokens for power. The total 
required to pay for everything was well over the total number of tokens we had to spend. On the 
floor was a map of the nation with the regions marked out and token stations located at strategic 
points with indications of the total number of tokens needed to sort that particular problem. 
Decisions needed to be made. Priorities needed to be identified. Paying for power might seem to 
benefit the people on the Plains where the power sources were situated, but power was needed by 
the whole country. But what use was putting money into power, if there was no security to protect 
the sources of power from rebel attacks? If money went into both power and security, then there 
was insufficient left to pay for hospitals and food. Many sensible options were suggested, but the 
decision making structures decided upon by the audiences in both performances I attended were 
simply not up to the job. In the London performance, with no structure in place at all, those who 
shouted loudest entered into what philosopher Jürgen Habermas would term strategic dialogue, 
simply attempting to win their case, barely listening to other options, while most of resigned 
ourselves to silence and the seemingly inevitable collapse of our nation. The one vote per person 
system concluded in everyone being handed a token which they could place on the token station of 
their choice. But without any strategic overview, how to make best use of this limited agency? If I 
put my one token on a station that required three, and no-one else put their tokens there, then my 
token was wasted. My agency, as an individual, as a singularity, was defeated by the lack of 
consensus, the lack of leadership, the lack of structure within which my voice could meet with other 
voices to debate how we might collectively make the most of the resources we had. I wanted a voice 
and had been given a token and the agency at my disposal only reached as far as choosing between 
a wasted token on a hospital that wouldn’t be built, or a vaccination that I thought was the least of 
the priorities given the situation. 
At the performance in Warwick, the chairperson who had been forced to take the role was 
overwhelmed by the situation. A smaller audience than in London, and one where many of the 
participants were known to each other from the West Midlands theatre community, the debate 
became raucous and anarchic. Because there was no system in place to hold or allocate the tokens, 
the breakdown in dialogue led to someone simply grabbing a pile of tokens and placing them all on a 
hospital, claiming that this was now their own private hospital – a carnivalesque echo of the 
purchase of public services by private business initiated in the UK by the Thatcher government. 
Another instance of proactive agency – going  beyond the choices we had been given – resulted in 
the theft of many of the remaining tokens going into a participant’s pocket. The confrontation that 
ensued at this individual criminal act then took up all the remaining time we had to save the country 
until the energy supplies ran out, as we had been warned they would, and we were plunged into 
darkness.  
Prompted by Breel’s questionnaire to consider if my political views had changed in any way I 
was forced to admit that both my experiences had simply strengthened my preference for clear 
leadership and institutional systems of governance over more collectivist or anarchic models be that 
in political organisations or performance processes.  Beyond my own personal predilection, 
however, the outcomes I had experienced in Early Days illuminated some of the real paradoxes that 
seemed to lurk behind the seductive rhetoric of the philosophers noted above. Again, this is not to 
flatten out the intricacies of such work nor deny its political currency. Moreover, I am not intending 
to conflate philosophical theory directly with theatrical practice, but simply to propose that the 
anxieties of participating in Coney’s work led me to return to such philosophy with questions that 
had now been refined by my direct experience within forms of governance that had lacked the kind 
of authority also treated with suspicion by the philosophers in question. And in this return it 
appeared clearer to me that there was a paradox at the heart of much of this work. For these 
philosophers, and those scholars who draw on them, seem, on the one hand, to tend, 
understandably, towards a libertarian reaction against the old left, against state-socialism and its 
totalitarian tendencies and ideologically conformist communities; favouring instead the 
emancipation of singular subjectivities which can serendipitously converge in unanticipated 
constellations of disparate points of resistance. Yet it is notable, on the other hand, how often these 
uncoordinated points of resistance are envisaged – implicitly or explicitly – by the philosophers in 
question as converging on a common aim, that being the subversion or disruption of global capital. 
Yet if each singular response is not led by any ideological or artistic intention, if the proactive agency 
that erupted at various points of Early Days was not invited by the affordances of the performance 
structure itself, then the consequences of such agency cannot be politically calculated or directed. In 
one instance, a small collective within the overall audience had decided on revolution; in another, an 
individual had taken the neoliberal opportunity the breakdown in order had afforded him and 
introduced privatisation as an unforeseen and unanticipated co-ordinate of the debate. In a third, an 
individual had undertaken a criminal act, and broken the rules of the game for purely personal gain. 
Perhaps it’s not entirely fair to blame philosophers for the failure of real ‘singularities’ to live up to 
their theoretical promise, but what was particularly interesting for me in reflection on my 
experience was the seemingly unresolvable tension that was illuminated in philosophies, such as 
Rancière’s, between the position of ideological preference that he expresses throughout his oevre 
(the desire for global capital to be challenged or subverted) and a thesis which explicitly refrains 
from persuading individuals towards that political end. The imperative is rather that each should use 
their political agency to disrupt the current coordinates, or distribution of the sensible, in an entirely 
self-directed way, which could as easily result in newly configured coordinates for global capital to 
seize on, as newly configured coordinates that might subvert it. For those who follow Rancière and 
perceive the notion of effect, or ideological agency, within art practice, to be either misguided or 
illusory, this is a self-evident risk of artistic activity – it is, in fact, the only, or the best, politics that 
art can do. But for this particular spectator, what my experiences in Early Days illuminated for me, 
precisely through the audience’s failure on either occasion to offer a better form of government 
than the one of which I already despaired, were the limitations of the over-hasty rejection of 
systems of authority or competency that Rancière’s philosophy might sometimes be seen to imply; a 
throwing out of the potential of progressive ideologically-driven leadership with the bathwater of 
failed state socialism, or a throwing out of the potential of representational governance with the 
bathwater of failed European democratic rule at the present time. 
Significantly for a scholar invested in both theatre and politics, these thoughts arose not only 
from the form of the theatrical praxis I participated in on those two occasions, but also from a 
thinking-through of theatrical praxis more generally in terms of the authority that was absent in this 
particular model. The piece was thus, for me, an ideal research and development space for 
experientially thinking through models of political participation. If Early Days had been a 
representational drama that demonstrated through fiction that leaderless revolution would fail, such 
a play would have always remained a merely subjective account, or even straw target, that was easy 
to dismiss, one writer’s opinion given authority only by their right to pronounce their chosen 
narrative in a public cultural space. The opportunity presented by Early Days was to watch, or 
experience, the failure at work in real time, to witness, not actors undertaking the parts of failure 
that had been strategically scripted for them, but people who were, mostly, trying to succeed, and 
yet failing spectacularly, nonetheless.  The point of the piece on its own terms, as Mees and Breel 
both indicated, may well have been to maximise creative agency or the freedom to fail, rather than 
to lead to any particular political outcome, but where the piece succeeded for me was in its capacity 
to gesture to precisely what the performance seemed – on the nights I attended – both politically 
and artistically unable to achieve.  
What was required artistically and politically for the outcome that I desired, despite the aims 
of the piece, was much less choice, much less improvisational space, and much less freedom. More 
top-down structural constraints from the company and the imposition of a decision making system 
with clearer and fewer choices to be made might have resulted in time being freed up to investigate 
in more depth the implications of those choices and the opportunity for meaningful debate. All 
experienced theatre makers know that improvisations work best when they are structured by rules. 
The command ‘improvise’ leaves an actor flailing in too much freedom; give the actor rules – you can 
only use these three words, you can only move in straight lines, you must stand when the other 
actor sits – enables creativity to function, even enabling the creativity to break the rules that have 
been given, an impossibility if there are no rules to break in the first place.  Perhaps this is precisely 
the insight that theatre praxis has to offer the current field of radical philosophy and political theory, 
the counterpoint to Rancière in that it is sometimes- perhaps most often - an understood and fully 
consensual upholding of the distribution of the sensible within the rehearsal or performance space 
that leads to the most successful outcome. The director is not a dictator, but they have a specific 
role that is drawn from their privilege of sharing the perspective of the spectator, for whom the 
performance is made. The actors are not prevented from fully participating in the creative process, 
but while testing out material they are freed from an otherwise split perspective of performing and 
attempting simultaneously to view the whole. Rancière’s theory is politically invaluable in its 
insistence that these roles – and others – should be open to all, and interchangeable between all. 
Moreover, he never insists that the role of schoolmaster should be abandoned but only that the 
schoolmaster (or director, or artist) remains ignorant and willing to learn, to encourage the 
contribution of the other. I would argue that this sits quite comfortably with the fact that both 
artistic and political praxis can make very good use of temporary or strategic authority to propose 
and organise collective structures and direction; and an overemphasis on uncoordinated singularities 
to the detriment of this possibility is good for neither politics nor art. The best constellations of 
singularities might, at the end of the day, be most likely to emerge in well-structured improvisations, 
led by an experienced and trusted director; and political revolutions – as the turn towards socialism 
in parliamentary systems across Europe may yet demonstrate – might be more likely to have the 
desired political effect and lead to ‘better nations’ if harnessed by those given the democratic 
authority to lead than left too much to unpredictable and disparate interventions. 
 
Acknowledgements 
Thanks to Annette Mees and Astrid Breel for very helpful and enlightening discussions.  
 
References 
Breel, A. 2015a. Conversation with Astrid Breel, Bristol, 19 August. 
Breel, A. 2015b. Unpublished Working Group Paper, Theatre and Performance Research Association 
(TaPRA), University of Worcester, 9 September. 
Hardt, M. and Negri, A. 2000. Empire (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, Harvard University 
Press). 
Mees, A. 2015. Conversation with Annette Mees, Coventry, 14 May.  
Nancy, J. 1991. The Inoperative Community, ed. P Conner,  trans. P. Connor, L. Garbus, M. Holland, S. 
Sawhney, (Minneapolis and Oxford: University of Minnesota Press). 
Rancière, J. 2004. The Politics of Aesthetics, ed. & trans. G. Rockhill (London and New York, 
Bloomsbury). 
Rancière, J. 2009. The Emancipated Spectator, trans. G. Elliott (London and New York, Verso). 
Read, A. 2008. Theatre, Intimacy and Engagement: The Last Human Venue (Basingstoke, Palgrave 
Macmillan). 
Ridout, N. 2013.  Passionate Amateurs: Theatre, Communism and Love (Ann Arbor, The University of 
Michigan Press). 
Thompson, J. 2009. Performance Affects: Applied Theatre and the End of Effect (Basingstoke, 
Palgrave Macmillan). 
White, G. 2013. Audience Participation in Theatre: Aesthetics of the Invitation (Basingstoke, Palgrave 
Macmillan). 
Wickstrom, M. 2012. Performance in the Blockades of Neoliberalism: Thinking the Political Anew 
(Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan).   
 
 
 
 
